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Case Comments
Establishing an Objective Intent Standard for the
Labor Antitrust Exemption: Consolidated Express,
Inc. v. New York Shipping Association
Shortly after World War H1, cargo ships, traditionally loaded
directly by longshoremen, were fitted with standardized con-
tainers.' These containers could be loaded and unloaded-
stuffed and stripped, in shipping terminology-away from the
pier, giving rise to the business of "consolidation" 2 of contain-
ers and decreasing the demand for longshoremen's labor.3
Containerization became a source of dispute between the Inter-
national Longshoremen's Association (ILA) and the shippers,
and after an initial acquiescence by the union,4 collective bar-
gaining between the ILA and the New York Shipping Associa-
tion (NYSA) resulted in promulgation of the Rules on
Containers (the Rules). The Rules, which provided that all
stuffing and stripping of cargo within fifty miles of the dock
must be done by ILA labor, were enforced by the imposition of
fines 5 and the refusal by NYSA members to supply containers
1. Cargo is loaded into the containers which are then placed on a ship.
See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 498
(3d Cir. 1979).
2. Consolidation, one aspect of containerization, is the process of packing
together the cargo of various customers who ship less than container-load lots.
See id.
3. Traditional cargo handling costs at the port have been estimated to ac-
count for up to 70% of total shipping costs. Containerization reduces costs (in-
cluding damages, insurance, customs time, and paper work) and dead time in
port. The result is a startling jump in labor productivity and a reduction in the
demand for labor. See Ross, Waterfront Labor Response to Technological
Change: A Tale of Two Unions, 21 LAB. L.T. 397, 399400 (1970).
4. In 1959 the ILA was at a low point of organizational strength. Investiga-
tions into the corruption and malfeasance of some of its officers had led to its
expulsion from the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1953 and had re-
sulted in faction and a lack of centralized control within the organization. See
id. at 400. The 1959 collective bargaining agreement with the shippers "con-
ceded that 'any employer shall have the right to use any and all types of con-
tainers without restriction.'" Id. at 401.
5. See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 452 F.
Supp. 1024, 1027 n.3 (D.N.J. 1977), nwdified, 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979). These
fines were imposed by NYSA on its members for any container that passed
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to any off-pier consolidators operating in violation of the Rules. 6
Consolidated Express (Conex) and Twin Express (Twin),
consolidators operating between Puerto Rico and the Port of
New York, suffered a loss of business due to the operation of
the Rules on Containers.7 They sought and obtained a National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) finding that the NYSA, the ILA,
and others8 violated National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) sec-
tion 8(b) (4), which prohibits union coercion of an employer to
cease dealings with another employer,9 and section 8(e), which
prohibits agreements between unions and employers to cease
such dealings.'0 Conex and Twin then brought an action for
through the Port and did not comply with the provisions of the Rules. 602 F.2d
at 499.
6. See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 452 F.
Supp. 1024, 1028 (D.N.J. 1977), modified, 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979).
7. Defendant vessel owners, see note 8 infra, who together with one other
vessel owner controlled all containers for shipping between Puerto Rico and
New York, refused to supply Conex and Twin with empty containers. Cargo al-
ready loaded into containers by Conex and Twin was stripped and restuffed us-
ing ILA labor at the New York pier for shipment to Puerto Rico. 602 F.2d at 499.
8. In addition to the NYSA and the ILA, other defendants included Inter-
national Terminal Operating Company, John M. McGrath Corporation, Pittson
Stevedoring Corporation, United Terminals Corporation, and Universal Mari-
time Services Corporation (all stevedores); and Sea-Land Service and Seatrain
Lines (operators of vessels engaged in common carriage between Puerto Rico
and the Port of New York). Id. at 498.
9. Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) makes it an unfair labor practice
to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce, where ... an object thereof is-forc-
ing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transport-
ing, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B) (1976).
10. Section 8(e) reads in relevant part-
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any
employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain
from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any
of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with
any other person, and any conduct or agreement entered into hereto-
fore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent
unenforceable and void ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
The General Counsel of the NLRB, acting pursuant to section 10(l) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA), 28 U.S.C. § 160(l), obtained a pre-
liminary injunction of enforcement of the Rules against Conex and Twin pend-
ing Board disposition of the case. Balicer v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 364 F. Supp. 205 (D.N.J.), aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1973) (Conex);
Balicer v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 86 LIRRM. 2559 (D.N.J. 1974)
(Twin). The NLRB found that enforcement of the agreement embodied in the
Rules on Containers violated § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) and that the agreement itself, be-
cause it was not justified on work preservation grounds, see note 21 infra, vio-
lated § 8(e). To reach its results the NLRB first concluded that the work
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treble damages under the federal antitrust laws." The district
court refused summary judgment for plaintiff in order to con-
sider further the applicability of the labor antitrust exemp-
tion.12 On appeal from the denial of summary judgment,13 the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded, holding that
although the existing labor antitrust exemption was not appli-
cable to the conduct in this case, a new exemption arose in an-
titrust treble damage actions for conduct violative of labor law
when the defendants could not reasonably foresee that their
agreement was unlawful under labor law, the agreement was
"intimately related" to an object of collective bargaining
thought at the time to be legitimate, and the agreement im-
posed no more restraints than necessary. Consolidated Ex-
press, Inc. v. New York Shipping Association, 602 F.2d 494 (3d
Cir. 1979).
The existing labor antitrust exemption is composed of leg-
islative and judicial exemptions designed to balance the inter-
ests of labor organizations with those of a competitive
economy. Under initial interpretations of the Sherman Act,14
whose broad provisions were designed to protect a competitive
economy, labor organizations were considered "combination [s]
'in restraint of trade.' ,u5 In response to the large number of
traditionally done by the ILA was the loading and unloading of ships, and that
this work was distinguishable from the stuffing and stripping of containers.
The NLRB ordered a cease-and-desist order, International Longshoremen's
Ass'n (Consolidated Express, Inc.), 221 N.L.R.B. 956, 90 L.R.R.M. 1655 (1975),
which was enforced by the Second Circuit International Longshoremen's Ass'n
v. NLRB, 537 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
11. Conex and Twin claimed that the defendant's actions, see note 7 supra,
constituted a group boycott violative of §§ 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1, 3 (1976). Plaintiffs sued for damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1976), which allows recovery of treble damages for any violation of
the antitrust laws. Plaintiffs also brought an action under § 303(b) of the La-
bor-Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1976), which grants
a private right of action for actual damages that result from violation of
§ 8(b) (4) of the NLRA.
12. 452 F. Supp. at 1031, 1043-44. In the § 4 antitrust claim, the court found
that an examination of anticompetitive effect and anticompetitive intent was
warranted. Id. at 1044. In the LMRA § 303(b) action, the court gave collateral
estoppel effect to the NLRB's finding of labor law violations. The court refused
summary judgment on the violations count, however, in order to consider
whether Conex operations that were in violation of ICC licensing law would
raise an illegality defense. Id. at 1036.
13. Interlocutory appeal was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
The Third Circuit granted summary judgment on the LMRA § 303(b) claim, dis-
allowing any defenses, but remanded on the § 4 claim. 602 F.2d at 527.
14. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)).
15. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 292 (1908). Prior to the passage of the
Sherman Act, labor organizations had been found illegal under a criminal con-
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cases brought against unions under this interpretation, 6 Con-
gress passed a series of legislative acts exempting certain labor
activity from antitrust scrutiny.'7 Subsequent interpretation of
these enactments held labor unions exempt from antitrust lia-
bility so long as they acted in their self-interest and did not
combine with non-labor groups.18
spiracy theory. People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1835). See M. HArNLEa,
CASES AND MATERAMLS ON LABOR LAw 304-05 (1944).
16. Under this interpretation, more antitrust actions were brought against
labor unions than against capital combinations. See Moeller, Employee Rights
and Antitrust Liability Liability: Organized Labor's Exemption after Connell,
48 Miss. L.J. 713, 714 (1977); Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition:
The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 31
(1963).
17. Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act exempted union members "law-
fully carrying out the legitimate objects" of the union, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731
(1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976)), and "labor dispute[s] concerning
terms or conditions of employment," ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914) (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976)), from Sherman Act liability. The main goal of these provi-
sions was to exempt the basic union tools of strikes and primary boycotts. See
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229-30, 233-36 (1941). The Supreme
Court, however, initially narrowly interpreted these provisions, resubmitting
unions to much of the same antitrust liability. See, e.g., Bedford Cut Stone Co.
v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927); United States v. Brims,
272 U.S. 549 (1926); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
The Supreme Court eventually retreated from this approach and began to limit
liability either by examining whether the union possessed a subjective intent
to limit interstate commerce as opposed to the process of manufacture, see
United Leather Worker's Local 66 v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457,
471 (1924); UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 411-13 (1922), or by differ-
entiating between intent to affect the product and intent to affect the labor mar-
ket. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 510-13 (1940).
Congress also reacted by enacting the Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat.
70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976)), which prohibits courts from
issuing injunctions in labor disputes, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 107 (1976), and broadens
the definition of such disputes, 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1976), and by enacting the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976 & Supp. H 1978)), which gives employees the right to or-
ganize and engage in concerted activities previously subject to antitrust liabil-
ity. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
18. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941). Compare Al-
len Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 809-11 (1945) (an illegal combina-
tion with non-labor groups is found when a union joins a business conspiracy
for the purpose of market control) with Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 823-24
(1945) (no antitrust liability when unilateral action by a union acting on a per-
sonal vendetta forces an employer out of business). Until the Pennington and
Jewel Tea decisions in 1965, see notes 23-25 infra and accompanying text, cases
following the Allen Bradley and Hunt decisions did not significantly depart
from the unilateral action/self-interest test. See Los Angeles Meat & Provision
Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 99-101 (1962); United States v. Em-
ploying Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 190 (1954); United States v. Women's
Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 461-63 (1949); United Bhd. of Carpenters &
Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947); Zimmer & Silberman, Pennington
and Jewel Tea: Antitrust Impact on Collective Bargaining, 11 AcrrrnusT Bua.
857, 863-64 (1966). Short of a combination with a business conspiracy, however,
1278 [Vol. 64.1275
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While establishing this legislative antitrust exemption,
Congress also refined national labor policy by amending the
NLRA.19 Congress expressed strong support for the process of
collective bargaining20 and placed an explicit duty on unions
and employers to negotiate the terms of certain mandatory
subjects.2 1 This process of negotiation and agreement between
this statutory exemption was thought to protect most union activity from anti-
trust liability. See Zimmer & Silberman, supra, at 862-64.
19. Much of the activity that had been scrutinized under antitrust law be-
came an unfair labor practice when Congress refined the NLRA by enacting
the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 61 Stat. 136.
(1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-167 (1976 & Supp. I 1978)), which prohibits
most secondary activity. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1976). See Meltzer, Labor Un-
ions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHi. L. REV. 659, 669
(1965). "The element of 'secondary activity' is introduced [into the context of a
boycott] when there is a refusal to have dealings with one who has dealings
with the offending person." Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 44 MmN. L. REv. 257, 271 (1959)). The Taft-Hartley
Amendments also provide injunctive relief. 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1976). The La-
bor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, Pub. L.
No. 86-257, § 201(e), § 704(a)-(c), 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3), (b)(4), (b)(7), (e), (f) (1976)), prohibits hot cargo agreements
(agreements between a union and an employer requiring that the employer not
handle the cargo of another employer). See also St. Antoine, Secondary Boy-
cott: From Antitrust to Labor Relations, 40 ANTITRusT L.J. 242, 252-53 (1971).
The Landrum-Griffin Act also provides a private right of action for actual dam-
ages for violation of § 8(b) (4) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976).
20. It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have oc-
curred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
ing and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and condi-
tions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
21. Mandatory subjects of collective bargaining are defined by § 8(d) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), to include "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment." Such mandatory subjects of bargaining also in-
clude work preservation, which involves efforts by the bargaining unit employ-
ees to preserve for themselves work traditionally done by that unit. See
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210-15 (1964). Work pres-
ervation is distinguished from work acquisition, which refers to efforts to obtain
work not traditionally done by the bargaining unit. The distinction rests on
whether the employees of the bargaining unit are attempting to influence their
primary employer or other, secondary employers. See Comment, Work Recap-
ture Agreements and Secondary Boycotts: ILA v. NLRB (Consolidated Express,
Inc.), 90 HARv. L. REV. 815, 821 (1977). Although agreements concerning work
preservation have been protected from secondary proscriptions by virtue of
their mandatory classification, National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386
U.S. 612, 633-42 (1967), agreements concerning work acquisition are not pro-
tected and violate labor law. NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters Local 638,
429 U.S. 507, 514-21 (1977). Although conceptually appealing, the preservation-
acquisition distinction fails when dealing with the problem of work reacquisi-
tion. Reacquisition refers to the recapturing of work traditionally done by
12791980]
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a union and an employer, however, could be interpreted as a
combination with a non-labor group and thus beyond the pro-
tection of the statutory antitrust exemption. Without such pro-
tection, any collective bargaining agreement that imposed
market restraints could be seen as an agreement in restraint of
trade.22 To guard against this view, courts created a non-statu-
tory exemption that protects some collective bargaining agree-
ments having anticompetitive effects.
The non-statutory exemption, which is highly intertwined
with specific statutory provisions and general congressional ex-
pressions of support, originated in UMW v. Pennington23 and
Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.24 No
opinion in these companion decisions commanded a majority,
and thus the precise boundaries of the non-statutory exemp-
tion "are neither clear nor entirely coherent."25 Commentators
workers of the bargaining unit but which now, because of technological change,
is done in a different manner. Comment, supra, at 821. Lower courts and the
NLRB have not ruled consistently with regard to whether reacquisition is a
protected union goal. For decisions taking a narrow view of reacquisition (ex-
amining a specific description of the work performed and the manner of per-
formance), see, for example, Associated Gen'l Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 514
F.2d 433, 438 (9th Cir. 1975), Local 282, Teamsters (D. Fortunato, Inc.), 197
N.L.R.B. 673, 678, 80 L.R.R.M. 1632, 1637-38 (1972). For those taking a broader
view of work reacquisition, see, for example, Local 742, United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 683, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Canada Dry
Corp. v. NLRB, 421 F.2d 907, 909-10 (6th Cir. 1970); Retail Clerks Local 648
(Brentwood Mkts., Inc.), 171 N.L.R.B. 1018, 68 L.R.R.M. 1219 (1968). For a gen-
eral discussion of the topic, see Comment, supra.
Some court decisions have found the Rules on Containers a valid work
preservation device. See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB,
613 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 727 (1980) (No. 79-1082); In-
tercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d
884 (2d Cir. 1970). Others have found the Rules violative of labor law. See, e.g.,
International Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1575 v. NLRB, 560 F.2d 439 (1st Cir.
1977); Humphrey v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 548 F.2d 494 (4th Cir.
1977) (dictum); International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 537 F.2d 706 (2d
Cir. 1976).
22. See note 104 infra.
23. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
24. 381 U.S. 676 (1965). Some commentators also include the Allen Bradley
decision, see note 18 supra, as a source for the non-statutory exemption. See
Mann, Powers, & Roberts, The Accommodation Between Antitrust and Labor
Law: The Antitrust Labor Exemption, 30 LAB. L.J. 295, 297 (1979).
25. Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D.D.C. 1976). The Pen-
nington case arose from a small mining company's claim that the UMW and
certain large coal producers agreed to eliminate competition in the coal indus-
try in order to solve the problem of overproduction. To that end, the union al-
legedly agreed to impose the terms of the Wage Agreement on all coal
producers, regardless of their ability to pay. The Supreme Court held that such
allegations, if proved, would strip the collective bargaining agreement of its an-
titrust immunity. Three separate opinions were written in the case. Justice
White's opinion focused on the notion of employer conspiracy to which the
LABOR ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
generally look to Justice White's opinions2 6 in the two deci-
union becomes a party. 381 U.S. at 664-66 (White, J.). Although Justice White
viewed the "basic defect" of the agreement to be the restraint on the union's
freedom to act, id. at 668 (White, J.), he did not view this restraint as alone suf-
ficient to strip the collective bargaining agreement of its antitrust immunity.
Justice White required that conspiracy be demonstrated by some "additional
evidence" beyond the agreement itself. Id. at 665 n.2 (White, J.). Justice Doug-
las' concurring opinion interpreted this as requiring predatory intent. Id. at
672-73 (Douglas, J., concurring). However, given Douglas' reference to Inter-
state Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), and its doctrine of "con-
scious parallelism," he apparently would be willing to infer such intent from
the collective bargaining agreement itself. See Cox, Labor & the Antitrust
Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L. REv. 317, 323 (1967); DiCola, Labor
Antitrust: Pennington, Jewel Tea and Subsequent Meandering, 33 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 705, 718 (1972); Note, Labor-Antitrust: Collective Bargaining and the Com-
petitive Economy, 20 STAN. L. REV. 684, 706 (1968); Comment, Labor's Antitrust
Exemption, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 254, 262 (1967) [hereinafter cited as California
Comment]; Comment, Union-Employer Agreements and the Antitrust Laws:
The Pennington & Jewel Tea Cases, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 901, 922-23 (1966) [herein-
after cited as Pennsylvania Comment]. Justice Goldberg's dissent in Pen-
nington, which also served as his concurrence in Jewel Tea, took exception to
an assumption made by Justice White: that even mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining could be subject to antitrust liability. 381 U.S. at 664-65 (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting and concurring). To protect a "basic element" of collective bargain-
ing, Justice Goldberg argued, all such mandatory subjects should automatically
be exempt, id. at 710, (Goldberg, J., dissenting and concurring), and the defini-
tion of mandatory subjects should be expanded. See Comment, Labor's Anti-
trust Exemption After Pennington & Jewel Tea, 66 COLUM. IL REv. 742, 760-61
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Comment]; Pennsylvania Comment,
supra, at 927-28.
Jewel Tea, the companion decision to Pennington, concerned a collective
bargaining agreement negotiated by a union and an association of employers,
in which the union sought a provision limiting marketing hours for meat sales.
The district court found no evidence to support a conspiracy allegation and
concluded that the marketing hours restriction was designed to support the
union members' interests in conditions of employment. The Supreme Court
found the agreement exempt from antitrust scrutiny. The Justices split along
the same lines as in Pennington, and no opinion claimed a majority. Justice
White's Pennington analysis was unnecessary, because the district court's find-
ing of no conspiracy was not disturbed on appeal. For a labor antitrust exemp-
tion to apply, Justice White required, apparently in addition to a lack of a
business conspiracy, that the agreement be "intimately related" to legitimate
union goals and achieved through "bona fide, arm's-length bargaining in pur-
suit of... labor union policies." 381 U.S. at 689-90 (White, J.). Justice Douglas,
in his dissent in Jewel Tea, disputed the district court's finding of no conspir-
acy, stating as in Pennington that predatory intent to form an anticompetitive
conspiracy may be inferred from the collective bargaining agreement itself. Id.
at 737 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
26. Justice White's opinions are seen as a middle ground between Justice
Goldberg's broad labor perspective and Justice Douglas' narrow antitrust per-
spective. Siegal, Connolly, & Walker, The Antitrust Exemption for Labor-
Magna Carta or Carte Blanche?, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 411, 453 (1975). Justice
White's approach, however, has been criticized for failing to provide consistent
criteria with which to judge union conduct. See DiCola, supra note 25, at 725;
Columbia Comment, supra note 25, at 757-59. Justice Goldberg's approach has
been viewed as providing the only "systematic rationale". Cox, supra note 25,
at 328.
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sions and derive a two-pronged test to determine the availabil-
ity of the exemption.2 7
The first part of the test is lack of business "conspiracy." In
interpreting this test, one commentator has focused on whether
the union's agreement with one employer restricts its ability to
negotiate freely with other employers.28 Another view is that
the collective bargaining agreement itself is sufficient to consti-
tute the necessary conspiracy.29 Neither of these interpreta-
tions of the conspiracy test, however, is persuasive to most
commentators or courts.30 "Conspiracy" is generally defined as
some action or subjective intent to further a goal outside the
collective bargaining agreement.3 1 Most often this goal is to
damage competitors of the negotiating employer.3 2
The second part of the test for the applicability of the non-
statutory antitrust exemption under Pennington and Jewel Tea
is that the agreement be "intimately related" to a legitimate
union goal. It is not clear from Justice White's opinion what
should constitute a legitimate labor goal.33 Commentators have
viewed the category of legitimate labor goals as comprising a
27. See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1965, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV.
823, 825 (1965); Moeller, supra note 16, at 722; Zimmer & Silberman, supra note
18, at 869 (citing Handler, supra, at 825); California Comment, supra note 25, at
260; Comment, Application of Sherman Act to Labor Union, 50 Ti. L. REv. 418,
422-23 (1976). But see Comment, Labor's Antitrust Immunity After Connell, 25
AM. U.L. REV. 971, 979 (1976) [hereinafter cited as American University Com-
ment].
28. See Comment, Dimunition of Labor's Immunity under Antitrust Law,
21 Loy. L. REV. 980, 986-88 (1975).
29. This is Justice Douglas' view in Pennington, see note 25 supra, and is
consistent with antitrust definitions of conspiracy as nothing more than agree-
ment among parties. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S.
208 (1939).
30. The interpretations are troublesome because collective bargaining
agreements commonly result both in restrictions on a union's freedom of action
(e.g., most favored nation clauses, association bargaining), and in product mar-
ket restraints, see note 104 in fra and accompanying text. See DiCola, supra
note 25, at 715-19; Farmer, Association Bargaining: Pennington and Jewel Tea
Revisited, 12 ANTrrRUST Bum- 555, 558-63 (1967); Columbia Comment, supra
note 25, at 756-57.
31. See St. Antoine, Connelh Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law,
62 VA. L. RE V. 603, 610-611 (1976); Note, The Supreme Cour4 1964 Term, 79 HARv.
L REV. 56, 177-81 (1965).
32. This is also an interpretation of "predatory intent" under Allen Brad-
ley. See Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806, 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
983 (1968); DiCola, supra note 25, at 719; Stanford Note, supra note 25, at 693-94.
See also note 18 supra.
33. A mandantory subject of bargaining, however, "weighs heavily" in
favor of a legitimate labor goal. Local 189, Amalagamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel
Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965) (White, J.).
1282 [Vol. 64.1275
LABOR ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
set sometimes narrower 34 and sometimes broader35 than
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. Justice White's
opinion also fails to make clear what an "intimate relation"
measures. Some commentators hold that the phrase connotes
a test of the effects of an agreement36 under which the exemp-
tion would be available only if the labor interests advanced by
the agreement outweighed the actual injury to the competitive
economy that the agreement causes.37 Although Justice White
alluded to such a balancing test in a footnote in Jewel Tea,38 he
apparently did not apply it.9 An alternative argument is that
"intimately related" measures the parties' subjective intention
at the time of an agreement and that a reasonable belief in the
legitimacy of the goal would satisfy the second test.40
34. See Note, supra note 25, at 702; California Comment, supra note 25, at
267-70. This is the issue addressed by Justice Goldberg in his opinion in the
two cases. 381 U.S. at 699-700 (Goldberg, J., dissenting and concurring). See
note 25 supra.
35. See Note, supra note 25, at 713. It has also been suggested that Justice
White's test of legitimacy draws the line at mandatory subjects of bargaining.
See Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1967 Term, 75 YALE L.J. 59, 78
(1965).
36. See, Cox, supra note 25, at 326; Note, Labor Law-Antitrust Liability of
Labor Unions-Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 17 B.C. INDus.
& COM. L. REv. 217, 225 (1976).
37. See Willis, In Defense of the Court: Accommodation of Conflicting Na-
tional Policies, Labor and the Antitrust Laws, 22 MERCER L. REV. 561, 574
(1971); American University Comment, supra note 27, at 979; Comment, The La-
bor Antitrust Exemption" An Accommodation of Conflicting Congressional Pol-
icies, A Review After the Connell Decision, 11 NEw ENGLAND L. RE V. 643, 653
(1976). It has also been suggested that an ill-defined "intimately related" test
and confusing conspiracy standards could result in such a balancing test being
applied by the fact-finders regardless of their interpretation of "intimately re-
lated." See DiCola, supra note 25, at 725.
38. Justice White explained that the form of the agreement was not the es-
sential concern, but rather that the interest of the union members be balanced
against the relative impact on the product market. 381 U.S. at 690 n.5 (White,
J.). It is not clear from Justice White's opinion whether this balancing would
be used to determine if a subject was "intimately related" to a legitimate union
goal, whether the balancing would comprise a separate test after a determina-
tion of "intimate" relation, or whether the balancing would be necessary at all
upon a finding of "intimate" relation. See Cox, supra note 25, at 326; DiCola,
supra note 25, at 721-23; Columbia Comment, supra note 25, at 757-58. For a
later application of this test, see American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391
U.S. 99, 107 (1968).
39. See Zimmer & Silberman, supra note 18, at 869; Columbia Comment,
supra note 25, at 758-59. Justice White did, however, mention that the "appar-
ent and real" effect on competition was outweighed by the "Immediate and di-
rect" concern of the union. 381 U.S. at 691 (White, J.).
40. Under such a test, the court would determine what the parties reason-
ably intended to accomplish with the agreement and then determine whether
that goal was a legitimate union goal. See Cox, supra note 25, at 326; Note,
supra note 25, at 711. The parties' legitimate intent would also appear to pre-
clude a finding of "conspiracy." See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
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Subsequent cases have applied both "conspiracy" and "in-
timately related" tests with little consistency.41 When applying
a conspiracy test for the non-statutory exemption,42 courts gen-
erally have required that the conspiracy be demonstrated by
anticompetitive purposes of the union,43 and seemingly have ig-
nored Justice White's requirement 44 that a union not restrain
its own economic freedom. 45 When applying a test of intimate
relation, most courts have found the labor interest legitimate if
the agreement deals with a mandatory subject of bargaining 46
or is closely related to such subjects.47 The cases vary as to
whether "intimate relation" measures the effects 48 or the sub-
jective intent49 of an agreement.
The most recent Supreme Court decision concerning the
labor antitrust exempton is Connell Construction Co. v. Plumb-
ers & Steamfitters Local No. 100.50 The Court's discussion of
41. See DiCola, supra note 25, at 725.
42. See, e.g., Iodice v. Calabrese, 512 F.2d 383, 390 (2d Cir. 1975); Webb v.
Bladen, 480 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 1973); Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806, 814
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968); Cedar Crest Hats, Inc. v. United Hat-
ters, Cap & Millinery Workers, 362 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1966).
43. See, e.g., Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ. v. Ross Aviation, Inc., 504
F.2d 896, 903 (5th Cir. 1974); Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840,
848 (3d Cir. 1974); South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767,
782 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971); Lewis v. Pennington, 400
F.2d 806, 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968).
44. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 668 (1965).
45. See DiCola, supra note 25, at 717. See, e.g., Ramsey v. UMW, 416 F.2d
655 (6th Cir. 1969).
46. See, e.g., Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v. New York Ship-
ping Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884, 887 (2d Cir. 1970); Suburban Tile Center, Inc. v. Rock-
ford Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 354 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1965).
47. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 109 (1968)
(price floor found to protect wage scale); Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United Farm
Workers Organizing Comm., 494 F.2d 541, 557 (9th Cir. 1974) (union goal of rec-
ognition intimately related to wages, hours, and working conditions); National
Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 680, 308 F. Supp.
982, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (restriction on operation of plant outside union local's
area was a method of preserving wage scale).
48. See American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 109 (1968). In
general, however, balancing of anticompetitive effect is not required. See DiCo-
la supra note 25, at 753. See, e.g., Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v.
New York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884, 887 (2d Cir. 1970); National Dairy Prods.
Corp. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 680, 308 F. Supp. 982, 986
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
49. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 88,
410 F.2d 650 (8th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (union prohibition on sale of meat not
cut and packaged by its members remanded on question of motivation).
50. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). A union coerced a general contractor, with which it
had no collective bargaining agreement, to sign an agreement limiting its sub-
contracting to those firms with which the local had a current contract. The
Court held that neither the statutory nor the non-statutory exemptions were
available to the union. The Court denied the statutory exemption to the union
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the non-statutory exemption,5 1 although merely dictum, is nev-
ertheless significant. The Court apparently eliminated the con-
spiracy test for the applicability of the non-statutory
exemption.5 2 Moreover, in examining the agreement's relation-
ship to legitimate labor goals, the Court placed emphasis on the
actual and potential effects of the agreement,53 and thus
seemed to apply the balancing test alluded to by Justice White
in a footnote in Jewel Tea.5 It remains unclear what impact
the Court's discussion of the non-statutory exemption should
have, given the inapplicability of the discussion to the facts of
the case. The Connell decision itself leaves open the question
of what protection a collective bargaining relationship would of-
fer to an agreement with a restraint of the magnitude of that in
Connell.55 In a collective bargaining context, lower courts
could conceivably ignore Connell, treat it as precedent, or
merely use it as a guide in their decisions. In practice, lower
courts appear to have followed the first two options.
In determining the availability of the labor antitrust ex-
emption, some courts have ignored Connell and have continued
because of "concerted action or agreements" Id. at 622. The Court, however,
failed to make clear what constituted the concerted action or agreement.
Some commentators have argued that Connell may have abandoned the
Hutcheson and Allen Bradley doctrines that allowed unilateral action by a
union in its self-interest. See American University Comment, supra note 27, at
995-98; Comment, Supreme Court Holds that Labor Unions are not Exempt from
Antitrust Statutes, 44 FoRaDHA- L. REv. 191, 199 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Fordham Comment]; Comment, Agreement Between Union and "Stranger"
Building Contractor Obligating Contractor to Subcontract only with Parties to
Union's Collective Bargaining Agreements is not Exempt from the Sherman
Act, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1337, 1347 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Vanderbilt Com-
ment].
51. 421 U.S. at 622-26.
52. See Note, supra note 36, at 224; American University Comment, supra
note 27, at 995; Vanderbilt Comment, supra note 50, at 1347; Comment, Labor
Union Subject to Antitrust Liability as Well as Unfair Labor Practice Remedies
when its Unlawful Activity Directly Affects the Marketplace, 1976 Wis. L REV.
271, 282.
53. 421 U.S. at 625. Although the union had a legitimate labor interest of
organization, the method chosen to forward it was not legitimate. The subcon-
tracting clause did not fall within the construction industry exception to the
"hot cargo" prohibitions of § 8(e) of the NLRA, and thus was without that ex-
ception's protections. Connell therefore may impose an additional requirement
of methodological legality. See Moeller, supra note 16, at 730; Fordham Com-
ment, supra note 50, at 199.
54. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. It has been argued that the
balancing test was misapplied in Connell by over emphasizing the anitcompeti-
tive effects of the agreement and virtually ignoring the legitimate union inter-
est. See Moeller, supra note 16, at 730-31; American University Comment,
supra note 27, at 997 & n.140; Comment, supra note 28, at 993.
55. 421 U.S. at 625-26.
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to look at the intent of the collective bargaining parties, at-
tempting to determine whether the parties sought to further le-
gitimate labor goals or to damage competitors of the
negotiating employer.5 6 Other courts have paralleled the analy-
sis in Connell by applying an effects test, examining whether
the agreement actually furthered legitimate labor goals and
whether it resulted in injury to the competitive economy.5 7
In Consolidated Express, the Third Circuit held that the
existing non-statutory exemption was not applicable to the col-
lective bargaining agreement between the ILA and the NYSA.58
The court separated the Pennington and Jewdel Tea decisions,
and then relied on the latter-as it was interpreted in Con-
nell 5 9-to formulate two requirements for the availability of the
non-statutory exemption: "first, that the market restraint ad-
vance a legitimate labor goal, and, second, that the agreement
restrain trade no more than is necessary to achieve that goal."60
The Rules on Containers and the subsequent enforcement of
the Rules did not meet the first requirement, both because the
agreement did not advance a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining61 and, more importantly, because the finding of la-
bor law violations "preclude[d] recognition of complete non-
statutory antitrust immunity."62
56. See, e.g., California Dump Truck Owners Ass'n v. Associated Gen. Con-
tractors, 562 F.2d 607, 611-14 (9th Cir. 1977); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
No. 7, 452 F. Supp. 1381, 1384 (D. Colo. 1978); Signatory Negotiating Comm. v.
Local 9, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 447 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (D. Colo. 1978);
Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 452 F. Supp. 1024, 1041
(D.N.J. 1977).
57. See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614-16 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Barabas v. Prudential Lines, Inc.,
451 F. Supp. 765, 770-71 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 577 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1978). See also
Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 579 F.2d 484,
502-05 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting), cert denied,
439 U.S. 1089 (1979).
58. See text accompanying note 13 supra. The court was ruling on a denial
of summary judgment on the antitrust liability question. Because the anticom-
petitive impact of the agreement was "significant and uncontested," 602 F.2d at
518, defendants needed the exemption to escape liability.
59. The court recognized that Connell was not controlling precedent be-
cause it did not deal with a collective bargaining relationship, but reasoned that
its mode of analysis was similar to that in Jewel Tea. Id. at 517.
60. Id. at 517-18.
61. Id. at 518.
62. Id. Thus, if a plaintiff who has sustained a business or property injury
can show that the pertinent agreement is illegal under federal labor law, the
existing non-statutory labor antitrust exemption does not apply. The Court did
not apply its second requirement that the agreement "restrain trade no more
than is necessary," presumably because the union's goal was not "legitimate."
The exact meaning of this second requirement is thus not clear. See notes 78-80
infra and accompanying text.
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The court, however, remained concerned that the exemp-
tion protect not only lawful labor agreements, but also the col-
lective bargaining process. Antitrust injunctive relief63 does
not threaten this process and thus the court's narrow formula-
tion of the existing non-statutory exemption could apply with-
out difficulty in antitrust injunction actions. 64 The threat of an
action for treble damages, on the other hand, may discourage
parties to collective bargaining from reaching agreement on
topics that have not been conclusively catagorized as
mandatory subjects of bargaining under labor law. 65 If parties
agree on such a subject and the agreement is found to violate
labor law, the existing antitrust exemption will not protect the
parties from antitrust liability, given the preclusive effect of a
labor law violation under Consolidated Express.66 The court,
however, concluded that treble damages deterred improper ac-
tivity only if the parties to an agreement could reasonably fore-
see that the agreement was illegal. Thus, the court created a
new exemption applicable when antitrust treble damages are
sought for conduct already found to be a labor violation. De-
fendants can rebut the prima facie case that the labor antitrust
exemption does not apply6 7 if they can show (1) that during
collective bargaining they could not reasonably foresee that the
subject matter of their agreement was unlawful under labor
law (an objective standard of intent), and (2) that the agree-
ment was intimately related to an object of collective bargain-
ing thought at the time to be legitimate and went no further in
imposing restraints than was reasonably necessary. 68
63. Injunctive relief is provided by § 16 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 26
(1976).
64. 602 F.2d at 518.
65. The problem is simply whether a topic has been categorized as a
mandatory subject of bargaining (which is protected from labor proscriptions),
or as merely permissible. An agreement on a permissible topic can be a labor
law violation. See note 21 supra.
66. The non-statutory exemption applies equally to employers and unions.
See Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 729-30
(1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting and concurring); Scooper Dooper, Inc. v.
Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 847 n.14 (3d Cir. 1974); Philadelphia World Hockey
Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 498-500 (E.D. Pa.
1972); Comment, Employer's Mutual Aid: No Antitrust Laws Need Apply and
Almost All's Fair in Industrial War, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1160 (1976). Al-
though §§ 8(b) (4) and 8(e) of the NLRA provide an incentive to unions to resist
secondary activity, they do not provide this incentive to employers because the
sections do not apply to employers.
67. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
68. 602 F.2d at 521. This test differs from that used in an action for injunc-
tive relief; under the latter test, a belief that the agreement is legal under labor
law will afford no protection. See text accompanying notes 76, 87 infra.
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The Consolidated Express court, in formulating the ex-
isting non-statutory labor antitrust exemption, did not focus its
analysis on the subjective intent of the parties, but instead fo-
cused on the actual effects of the agreement. The requirement
that the market restraint imposed by a collective bargaining
agreement "advance a legitimate labor goal" may appear, at
first glance, quite traditional.69 The court, however, limited
such goals to mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.7 0 A
mandatory-nonmandatory test for legitimacy, although easy for
courts to apply,7 1 was not required by precedent 72 and may in
fact generate long-range difficulties. 73 Of potentially more
widespread impact than the restriction of legitimate labor goals
to mandatory subjects of bargaining, however, is the require-
ment under Consolidated Express that legitimate labor inter-
ests be advanced. This standard, unlike the "intimately
related" test enunciated by Jewel Tea,74 appears to require an
69. The "legitimate labor goal" idea is taken directly from Jewel Tea. See
note 25 supra. This requirement has as its source § 6 of the Clayton Act. See
note 17 supra.
70. The court reasoned that "a finding that the Rules were not a
mandatory subject of bargaining effectively undercuts any contention that they
so 'fall within the protection of the national labor policy."' 602 F.2d at 518.
71. This test is often applied by lower courts. See notes 46-47 supra and
accompanying text.
72. In Jewel Tea, neither Justice White nor Justice Goldberg limited legiti-
mate labor goals in this way. Justice White did not mention a specific test for
legitimate goals, stating only that a mandatory subject "weighs heavily" in
favor of an exemption. Justice Goldberg's reference to mandatory subjects was
a reaction to the possibility that, under Justice White's opinion, even agree-
ments dealing with mandatory subjects of bargaining could be subject to anti-
trust liability. His reference is therefore not a limitation of the exemption, but
an expansion. This is clearly seen in Justice Goldberg's broad definition of
mandatory subjects, which arguably included everything but the most blatant
of market restraints. See note 25 supra.
73. The mandatory-nonmandatory distinction is strained even under labor
law. Note, supra note 25, at 690-91. The strain results from the problem of clas-
sifying these subjects. A nonmandatory (permissive) subject of bargaining
may be negotiated, but is not protected from labor proscriptions. To apply this
distinction to antitrust law forces the NLRB into the position of determining
antitrust liability, and therefore reaches too far. See Zimmer & Silberman,
supra note 18, at 883-84. In Consolidated Express, the NLRB's determination
that the Rules on Containers did not concern work preservation-a mandatory
subject of bargaining-determined the antitrust liability of the parties to this
agreement. This determination regarding the Rules, however, has not been
made with any degree of consistency. See note 21 supra.
An additional problem with a mandatory-nonnandatory distinction is that
determinations of mandatory subjects of bargaining are likely to become fixed
for all time, a result that will stifle collective bargaining by effectively undercut-
ting the flexibility of the NLRB. Rubenstein, The Emerging Antitrust Implica-
tions of Mandatory Bargaining, 50 MARQ. L. REV. 50, 76 (1966).
74. See notes 33-40 supra and accompanying text.
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after-the-fact determination of the effects of the agreement. In-
stead of measuring what the collective bargaining agreement
was intended to accomplish, the term "advance" focuses on
what the agreement has accomplished.7 5 This change of focus
from the parties' intentions to what the agreement accom-
plishes narrows the exemption and creates uncertainty at the
bargaining table as to the propriety of the agreement.7 6 Again,
the precedential support for this requirement is unclear.
77
The second requirement of the Consolidated Express test,
that the agreement "restrain trade no more than is necessary,"
is an even more unusual requirement in the labor-antitrust ex-
emption case law.7 8 Under this test, in addition to "advancing"
a legitimate goal, the collective bargaining parties must adopt
the narrowest possible means of achieving that goal. This
"least restrictive means" approach requires not only an exami-
nation of the severity of the market restraint, but also an after-
the-fact determination of the wisdom of the union's choice of
methods.7 9 Although the Third Circuit claimed precedential
support for this approach from both Connell and Jewel Tea, the
approach was not followed in either decision.80
75. The court may have been following a suggestion in Connell that the
methods employed by a union be legal in order to preserve an exemption. Con-
nell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 625
(1975). See note 53 supra and accompanying text. That suggestion requires a
similar after-the-fact determination.
76. See notes 103-05 infra and accompanying text.
77. It is not clear if Justice White's "intimately related" standard in Jewel
Tea is an intent or an effect requirement. See notes 36-49 supra and accompa-
nying text.
78. This is a concept which has appeared in antitrust law. See note 108 in-
fra.
79. Courts, in assessing the wisdom of a union's objectives or methods, are
forced to rely on their own social, economic, and political philosophies. See
Moeller, supra note 16, at 730. This forced reliance implies that courts are bet-
ter able to decide the "proper" union methods and goals than are union lead-
ers. See Zimmer & Silberman, supra note 18, at 880-83. This assessment is
something for which courts have long been criticized. See Local 189, Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 697 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dis-
senting and concurring); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 485
(1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Cox, supra note 25, at 326; Summers, supra
note 35, at 78; Columbia Comment, supra note 25, at 745. This form of second-
guessing has also been criticized when used in a business context. See Ameri-
can Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1249-50 (3d Cir. 1975).
80. Although Jewel Tea relies heavily on the district court's finding that
the terms of the agreement were not feasible, 381 U.S. at 694, it includes no dis-
cussion of available, less restrictive means. See St. Antoine, supra note 31, at
615; American University Comment, supra note 27, at 980 n.62. Connell may
have been based on the restrictiveness of the agreement, but again, the opinion
includes no discussion of less restrictive alternatives. See American University
Comment, supra note 27, at 997. Some commentators point to Allen Bradley,
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The Third Circuit further demonstrated its move away
from an intent-based application of the non-statutory exemp-
tion by explicitly rejecting the Pennington analysis and thus
eliminating the traditional lack of conspiracy requirement.8 1 In
rejecting this requirement the court improperly relied on the
Jewel Tea and Connell decisions. Although it has been argued
that Connell eliminated the lack of conspiracy requirement
from the exemption,8 2 Connell was not decided in the context
of collective bargaining and is therefore not directly applicable
to the non-statutory exemption.83 Moreover, the propriety of
the court's separation of Jewel Tea from Pennington, decisions
issued by the same Court on the same day, is dubious.84
After defining the existing non-statutory exemption, the
Third Circuit concluded that the exemption was inapplicable in
Consolidated Express because "an NLRB finding of an unfair
labor practice precludes recognition of complete non-statutory
antitrust immunity."85 Thus, the NLRB's determination that
see note 18 supra, as the source of the "least restrictive means" requirement.
See St. Antoine, supra note 31, at 622; Note, The Supreme Cour; 1974 Term, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1, 240 (1975). One commentator has read Jewel Tea to require
the least restrictive means. See American University Comment, supra note 27,
at 979 n.58. Apparently, the least restrictive means requirement was not fol-
lowed in Consolidated Express, perhaps because the court considered it unnec-
essary upon finding that the union's goals were "illegitimate."
81. See notes 18, 25, 28-32 supra and accompanying text.
82. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
83. The court recognizes that Connell does not apply and yet proceeds to
apply its analysis. 602 F.2d at 517.
84. It is clear that these cases must be interpreted together; the Pen-
nington notion of "conspiracy" continues to be important in the non-statutory
exempton analysis. See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
85. 602 F.2d at 518. The court relied on "well reasoned decisions in other
circuits" that had argued that the national labor policy extends its protection
only so far as is legal under the labor laws. See Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pa-
cific Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 579 F.2d 484, 503 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler,
J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979); Commerce
Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 553 F.2d 793, 803-04 (2d Cir.) (Lum-
bard, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977); Mackey v.
National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434
U.S. 801 (1977); International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. United Con-
tractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384, 402 (3d Cir. 1973), modified, 494 F.2d 1353 (3d Cir.
1974). It is not clear from the court's opinion which unfair labor practices result
in automatic loss of exemption. The court referred specifically to § 8(e) of the
NLRA, stating that when only injunctive relief is sought, "a finding that an
agreement violates section 8(e) should always remove the antitrust exemp-
tion," 602 F.2d 519, but the court also referred generally to unfair labor prac-
tices, which would encompass all of § 8. Most likely the court intended to
preclude immunity only on violation of § 8(e), as the section is mentioned fre-
quently and involves agreements that presumably could constitute the neces-
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the Rules did not concern a mandatory subject of bargaining86
and that they violated sections 8(b) (4) and 8(e) of the NLRA,
became, in effect, a decision that the existing antitrust exemp-
tion was unavailable. Such automatic preclusion of the exemp-
tion on a finding of labor law violation focuses not on the intent
of the parties to the collective bargaining agreement, but rather
on the results of the agreement. Again, the Third Circuit lack-
ed strong precedential support for its approachS 7 the court it-
self has, since Consolidated Express, questioned the preclusive
effect of a labor law violation.88
Consolidated Express has thus both implicitly, by its for-
mulation of the non-statutory exemption and its preclusion
rule, and explicitly, by its rejection of the Pennington conspir-
acy line of cases,8 9 rejected any kind of an intent test for deter-
mining if an antitrust exemption is available to collective
bargaining parties. Although the court took note of its rejection
of Pennington, it failed to acknowledge that it had focused pri-
marily on the effects of the parties' agreement. A possible ex-
planation for the shift to an effects test lies in the difficulties
posed by a subjective intent standard. Subjective intent, a
"slippery" evidentiary issue,90 allows judges much leeway to
sary combination under antitrust law. Violations of § 8(b), on the other hand,
involve unilateral union action.
It should be noted that even without an unfair labor practice finding, the
conduct involved in Consolidated Express would not qualify for the non-statu-
tory exemption under the court's opinion. See note 120 infra and accompany-
ing text.
86. See notes 10, 21, 73 supra and accompanying text.
87. The court relied chiefly on dissenting and concurring opinions, see Ack-
erman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 579 F.2d 484, 503
(9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1089 (1979); Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 553 F.2d 793,
803 (2d Cir.) (Lumbard, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923
(1977), and on cases that do not directly address the preclusive effect of a labor
law violation on the availability of the exemption. See Mackey v. National Foot-
ball League, 543 U.S. 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
The court ignored other decisions of lower courts that had reached the opposite
result See, e.g., Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 7, 452 F. Supp. 1381, 1384
(D. Colo. 1978); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees
Local 680, 308 F. Supp. 982, 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
88. See Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 609 F.2d 1368, 1375 (3d Cir. 1979). In that case, the Third Circuit state&
" Te fact that in Connell Justice Powell considered the actual and potential an-
ticompetitive effects of the agreement independently of the § 8(e) issue sug-
gests that the presence of a § 8(e) violation may not itself decide the exemption
issue .... We therefore ... do not rule on the effect of a § 8(e) violation stand-
ing alone." Id.
89. 602 F.2d at 516. See notes 81-84 supra and accompanying text.
90. DiCola, supra note 25, at 715; see Meltzer, supra note 19, at 722; St. An-
toine, supra note 31, at 609; Note, supra note 25, at 686.
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speculate on a union's objectives and methods.91 Furthermore,
because subjective intent is difficult to prove, it may be easily
manipulated by parties to collective bargaining.92
A focus on effects, however, runs counter to the policy of
the labor antitrust exemption to balance the concern of anti-
trust law-the preservation of a competitive economy-with
that of labor law-the regulation of the struggle for power be-
tween unions and employers in which unions seek to achieve a
monopoly over the labor supply.93 Because free competition
does not adequately regulate the allocation of resources in the
labor market, collective bargaining is relied upon "to redress
the inequality of position and power of employer and em-
ployee."9 4 To that same end, the labor antitrust exemption is
intended to protect both specific union activities95 and the proc-
ess of collective bargaining itself.96
Hinging the applicability of the labor antitrust exemption
on the actual effects of a collective bargaining agreement im-
pairs the process of collective bargaining. It is essential to rec-
ognize the difference between business agreements that result
in a restraint of trade and collective bargaining agreements that
have a similar result. Antitrust law demonstrates that in a
business context it is proper to infer an anticompetitive intent
from the anticompetitive effects of the parties' actions. 97 Such
an inference is justified because business behavior is "normally
undertaken only after a full consideration of the desired results
and a weighing of the costs, benefits and risks."98 Moreover, an
emphasis on the effects of parties' actions, together with the
lack of detail in the antitrust law,99 leads to uncertainty for
business entities at the time of any action.OO This uncertainty
is useful as a regulatory tool01 because it discourages business
91. See generally note 79 supra.
92. This may be the concern expressed in Justice Douglas' opinions in Pen-
nington and Jewel Tea. See note 25 supra.
93. See Winter, supra note 16, at 66-67.
94. Kirkpatrick, Crossroads of Antitrust and Union Power, 34 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 288, 292 (1965).
95. Primary strikes, picketing, and boycotts are allowed.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), quoted in note 20 supra.
97. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 621-23
(1953); Comment, Broadening Labor's Antitrust Liability While Narrowing its
Construction Industry Proviso, 27 CATH. U.L REv. 305, 329-30 (1975); Note,
supra note 25, at 686.
98. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444 (1978).
99. See Rubenstein, supra note 73, at 51-53.
100. See id. at 53-54.
101. See Gifford, Communication of Legal Standards, Policy Developmen
and Effective Conduct Regulation, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 409, 429 (1971).
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entities from forming combinations and encourages such enti-
ties to use ingenuity in their actions, short of destroying or
frustrating meaningful competition.10 2 A collective bargaining
process, on the other hand, lacks the clarity of business ac-
tions, 0 3 and an inference of anticompetitive intent from the ef-
fects of a labor agreement is therefore less justified.04
Moreover, the uncertainty that results from use of an "effects"
test has disastrous results in the context of collective bargain-
ing.105 The negotiation process must be protected 06 in order to
encourage unions and employers to settle disputes. 0 7 Without
certainty, parties to collective bargaining are discouraged from
negotiating, and the process is frustrated.
The court in Consolidated Express, by rejecting an intent
analysis and adopting an effects test for the non-statutory ex-
emption, has in effect eliminated the exemption. The operation
of the exemption as it is formulated by the Third Circuit ap-
pears to require an antitrust "rule of reason" analysis for col-
lective bargaining agreements. 08 The court itself recognized
this practical effect when it applied a per se standard of anti-
102. "Although businessmen in general bemoan the administration of the
antitrust laws for this reason, it may very well be that this seemingly 'unprinci-
pled' approach to the public regulation of business holds within it one of the
conditions precedent for the flourishing of a dynamic business society." Ruben-
stein, supra note 73, at 54 (footnote omitted).
103. See Note, supra note 25, at 697.
104. All actions of labor unions could be viewed as yielding anticompetitive
product market effects. A common example is the effect that union wage de-
mands have on the ultimate product price. It is clear that such wage demands
do not, in every case, indicate an attempt at product market control See
DiCola, supra note 25, at 715; Note, supra note 31, at 180; Note, supra note 25, at
697-98.
105. See Note, supra note 25, at 694.
106. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), quoted in note 20 supra.
107. The chief area of dispute is the problem of technological change. To
submit an agreement dealing with such change to an after-the-fact determina-
tion of its legality or legitimacy under labor law using antitrust sanctions--or
even to a determination of its "mandatoriness" using labor remedies-could re-
strict collective bargaining and encourage a union to resist any technological
innovation. See, Comment, supra note 21, at 825. Such a determination is par-
ticularly unjust "where the asserted 'llegality' is in the periodically altered and
sometimes abstruse field of unfair labor practices." National Dairy Prods. Corp.
v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 680, 308 F. Supp. 982, 987 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
108. This has already been observed of the non-statutory exemption. Com-
ment, supra note 66, at 1160. See M. HA NLxn, supra note 15, at 239-40; Farmer,
supra note 30, at 559; Comment, supra note 97, at 331-34. Even the court's adop-
tion of a "less restrictive means" requirement, see notes 78-80 supra and ac-
companying text, reflects an antitrust analysis since this is a concept used in
antitrust law. See American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230,
1249 (3d Cir. 1975).
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trust illegality to agreements that had failed to qualify for the
exemption, stating that an "application of the rule of reason
[would be] redundant."109 A collective bargaining agreement
thus is afforded no more protection than a business action:"O
any agreement with too much anticompetitive effect is subject
to antitrust liability.
The court in Consolidated Express implicitly recognized
the problems with its formulation of the existing collective bar-
gaining exemption. Faced with a collective bargaining agree-
ment that involved an area of labor law plagued with
uncertainty,"' but that did not qualify under the court's effect-
oriented analysis of the existing exemption because of the
NLRB finding that it violated labor law, the Third Circuit cre-
ated a limited new exemption to protect more adequately the
process of collective bargaining.
The first element of the new exemption provides an objec-
tive test of the parties' intent during collective bargaining.
Such a test-that of reasonable foreseeability-is easy to apply
and avoids the practical problems associated with previous in-
tent standards.12 It allows parties to bargain in good faith and
yet places some limits on collective bargaining negotiations.
Moreover, the additional requirements that the agreement be
intimately related to a legitimate labor goal and be no broader
than is necessary to achieve that goal are both measured at the
time of the agreement. These requirements limit the exemp-
tion without subjecting parties to the agreement to the difficul-
ties of a pure effects test.113
109. 602 F.2d at 523. The dissent in Consolidated Express takes exception to
this per se application, id. at 527-29 (Weis, J., dissenting), as do most commen-
tators, fearing "immeasurable harm to the system of collective bargaining."
Comment, supra note 97, at 330. See M. HANDLER, supra note 15, at 239-40; St.
Antoine, supra note 31, at 609-10; Note, supra note 25, at 713. But see Siegel,
Connolly, & Walker, supra note 26, at 474.
110. Exempting a collective bargaining agreement only upon proof that the
agreement incorporated the least restrictive means to reach the legitimate goal
provides little protection because such a finding will exempt even a business
combination that otherwise would result in a per se antitrust violation. The
availability of a less restrictive means may even be a factor in determining
whether a restraint should be per se unlawful. See White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 270-72 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Siegel v. Chicken
Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 557 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
111. See note 107 supra. Specifically, the agreement involved the classifica-
tion of work reacquisition attempts. See note 21 supra.
112. See notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 97-110 supra and accompanying text. A problem with these
two latter elements concerns the proper time of the measurement. Although it
is essential that both elements be measured at the time of the agreement to
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Although the new exemption correctly focuses on intent
and creatively presents a workable standard to measure intent,
the exemption nevertheless fails to fulfill the court's self-pro-
claimed goal-to protect the process of collective bargaining." 4
In both its formulation of the existing non-statutory exemp-
tion" 5 and its preclusion of antitrust immunity on the finding
of a labor law violation," 6 the Third Circuit effectively discour-
ages collective bargaining." 7 The new exemption simply does
not go far enough toward offsetting the early restrictiveness of
the opinion. The new exemption is self-limiting, available only
upon a finding of a labor law violation." 8 Yet, the reason for
creating the exemption-protection of the collective bargaining
process-seems applicable regardless of whether there is a la-
bor violation." 9 Moreover, even if most situations warranting
exemption involve a labor law violation,120 plaintiffs injured by
collective bargaining actions may be encouraged not to allege
such violations so that the new antitrust exemption will not be
available to the defendants.12' Without the finding of a labor
law violation, defendants cannot take advantage of the new ex-
discern the parties' intent, many courts may fail to do so, reducing the test to
one of effects.
114. See 602 F.2d at 520.
115. See notes 60, 69-84 supra and accompanying text.
116. See notes 60-62, 85-88 supra and accompanying text.
117. See notes 93-110 supra and accompanying text.
118. The Third Circuit appears to have created the new exemption solely in
an effort to forestall problems that might result from the application of its rul-
ing that a finding of labor law violation precludes application of the existing col-
lective bargaining exemption. The court seems unaware that collective
bargaining will be chilled even when the existing effect-oriented exemption is
applied.
119. The court could be concerned with the availability of remedies to an
injured plaintiff. If a violation of labor law was found, both compensatory, 29
U.S.C. § 187 (1976), and injunctive relief, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976), would be
available under labor law even if the new antitrust exemption applied. If, how-
ever, no violation was found, a plaintiff would be without relief if the new ex-
emption applied.
120. Conduct may be found to be nonmandatory and to lack the secondary
effects necessary to be found an unfair labor practice, see note 19 supra, but
still have anticompetitive effects on the economy. See notes 104 supra and 124
infra. Or, conduct may in fact violate labor law, but not be ruled violative by
the NLRB if plaintiffs have not so alleged. The major cases dealing with the
non-statutory exemption appear to involve labor law violations. Connell, as dis-
cussed by the Supreme Court, involved a violation of § 8(e) of the NLRA, 421
U.S. at 626-35, and very possibly a violation of § 8(b) (4) of the Act. Both Pen-
nington and Jewel Tea appear "well within the reach of the National Labor Re-
lations Act." Summers, supra note 35, at 81.
121. Although this denies them the preclusive effect of such a violation,
plaintiffs do not thereby bear a heavier burden since a case must initially be
established, whether under labor or antitrust law.
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emption, and may be placed in the anomalous situation of rais-
ing their own labor law violation as a defense to an antitrust
action. The other limitation on the availability of the new ex-
emption is that the action must be one for treble damages. The
merit of precluding the availability of the exemption in actions
seeking injunctive relief is both questionable and problem-
atic.' 22 On the whole, the limitations of the new exemption se-
verely impede its ability to protect collective bargaining.
In summary, the Consolidated Express opinion is contra-
dictory. Most confusing are the opinion's internal contradic-
tions: although the Third Circuit professes concern toward the
collective bargaining process by its creation of the new exemp-
tion, both the court's interpretation of the non-statutory exemp-
tion and its finding that a labor law violation precludes
recognition of antitrust immunity tend to discourage that proc-
ess. This decision is thus not helpful to the collective bargain-
ing process, and is in addition inconsistent with both labor and
antitrust precedent.
The legitimate concerns of the court may best be dealt with
122. The court reasoned that the availability of treble damages is harsh on
the collective bargaining process and serves little use following a finding of la-
bor law violation. The court focused on the antitrust policy of deterrence, argu-
ing that this goal would not be served if parties to a collective bargaining
agreement could not foresee the application of antitrust sanctions to their
agreement. 602 F.2d at 520-21. Although this argument may be true, it fails to
appreciate the general deterrence goal of treble damages-deterrence not of
parties to this agreement, but deterrence of parties to future agreements. Fur-
ther, the possibility of receiving treble damages encourages private actions, the
"bulwark of antitrust enforcement." Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968). The possibility of receiving single dam-
ages, however, as are available under labor law, see note 11 supra, perhaps
does not provide this encouragement. Moreover, single damages may be insuf-
ficient either to cover the costs of private enforcement or to deter profitable ille-
gal activity.
The distinction between treble damages and injunctive relief may frustrate
a clearly defined Congressional limitation on injunctions in the labor context.
In the early history of the Sherman Act, injunctions were often sought by em-
ployers to frustrate any action by the union. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3,
IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 802 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235-36
(1941); FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 17-24 (1930). Congress
reacted by prohibiting such injunctions, see note 17 supra, and today private
actions for injunctive relief are not allowed. Perhaps, then, in the labor context,
treble damages are not harsher than injunctive relief and do not warrant being
distinguished.
Finally, such a distinction may prove meaningless in most situations when,
as in Consolidated Express, the conduct objected to has already been enjoined
under labor law. See note 10 supra. Plaintiffs in Consolidated Express were
clearly seeking treble damages, not further injunctive relief. As the new ex-
emption requires a labor law violation to be triggered, a section 10(l) injunction
will in most cases already have been issued.
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by a single intent-focused collective bargaining exemption. The
court's formulation of the "old" non-statutory exemption and
its preclusion rule, both of which discourage the process of col-
lective bargaining, should be abandoned. Neither are man-
dated by precedent123 and their concerns-problems of proof
with an intent test and the danger that parties to collective bar-
gaining may circumvent everything but an effects test--can be
alleviated by less drastic alternatives. A modified version of
the new exemption should be adopted for all collective bargain-
ing agreements that are scrutinized under antitrust law.
The modified collective bargaining exemption should re-
quire defendants to show that they reasonably believed that
their collective bargaining agreement, and the steps taken to
implement it, were intimately related to a legitimate labor
goal.124 This requirement, it has been argued, was forwarded
by Justice White in his opinion in Jewel Tea,12 5 but even with-
out such support the requirement appears sound. The modified
exemption would retain an objective intent standard in order to
avoid the chilling effect that an "effects" test might have on col-
lective bargaining,126 ensure that parties to collective bargain-
ing pursue legitimate goals, and avoid difficult proof
problems127
This test alone, however, may be susceptible to manipula-
tion by parties who couch their agreements in legitimate labor
terms while masking an ultimate aim of product market con-
trol.128 Therefore, parties to collective bargaining should lose
their exemption if the plaintiff can show that the defendant
joined in an agreement with the knowledge that it was to be
123. See notes 69-88 supra and accompanying text.
124. Mandatory subjects of bargaining should be used as a guide in deter-
mining the legitimacy of a labor goal, but courts should be free to exempt
agreements dealing with permissive subjects of bargaining. For example, a
union's request to place one of its members on the board of directors of an em-
ployer most likely would be a permissive subject of bargaining. See note 72
supra. If it is bargained over and agreed to by the union and the employer, it is
doubtful that such a provision would be found violative of antitrust law as cre-
ating an interlocking directorate. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976). The addi-
tion of the "intimately related" element should give courts this flexibility.
This test differs from both the old and new exemptions under Consolidated
Express. The above example under the old exemption would not be immune
from antitrust liability since it is not a mandatory subject of bargaining. It also
would not qualify under the new exemption because a labor law violation is not
involved.
125. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
126. See notes 104-07 supra and accompanying text.
127. See notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text.
128. The Allen Bradley and Pennington allegations illustrate this problem.
See notes 18, 25 supra.
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used for product market control.129 Although this extra safe-
guard may cause problems of proof,130 the alternatives are
more undesirable.'31 The collective bargaining agreement in
Consolidated Express could qualify under this modified ex-
emption if the parties to the agreement reasonably believed, in
light of the uncertainty in the law,132 that the Rules were legiti-
mate, and if there was a lack of proof that the employers in-
volved were using this agreement for market control.133
The modified collective bargaining exemption, using an ob-
jective standard of intent, would provide an easy test to admin-
ister, give primary consideration to labor goals, and apply to all
but manipulative behavior. If manipulation occurred, proof of
knowing union participation in a scheme for product market
control would subject such collective bargaining agreements to
antitrust scrutiny. This modified exemption would avoid the
chilling effect on collective bargaining that results from use of a
test that assesses the effects of labor agreements, and yet
would ensure that parties to an agreement focus on legitimate
labor goals. Most important, such an exemption would furnish
129. See Farmer, supra note 30, at 563. This avoids the problems of inter-
pretation of the Pennington conspiracy test, see notes 28-32 supra and accom-
panying text, and makes it clear that collective bargaining alone is not
sufficient to subject an agreement with product market effects to antitrust scru-
tiny. In other words, the standard to be used is that of Justice White (i.e., re-
quiring additional evidence) and not of Justice Douglas (inferring bad intent
from the agreement) in Pennington. See note 25 supra.
130. See notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text.
131. It is possible to use an objective measure under the "least restrictive
means" test, see notes 78-80 supra and accompanying text, but even an objec-
tive measure would pose difficult line-drawing problems for judges and juries
and could degenerate to an effects test. See note 113 supra. It is not suggested
that the proposed exemption resolves all problems in this area. Even focused
on legitimate labor goals and absent any employer intent of product market
control, collective bargaining agreements may pose serious product market ef-
fects. The only response can be that choices must be made between market re-
straints and the free functioning of collective bargaining.
It should be noted that under the proposed exemption, both the Pen-
nington and Jewel Tea cases, see notes 23-49 supra and accompanying text,
could be decided with the same results.
132. See note 21 supra. Defendants would have to prove that they actually
believed in the legitimacy of the Rules. The court would have to find such a
belief reasonable by looking at what were legitimate labor goals at the time of
the agreement and whether a reasonable person could have believed the Rules
were intimately related to those goals.
133. The case would still have been remanded to allow the trial court to de-
cide whether the defendant had proved its reasonable belief that the collective
bargaining agreement was intimately related to a legitimate labor goal, and
whether the plaintiff had rebutted this presumption of exemption by proving
that the defendant joined the agreement knowing the agreement was intended
to be used by businesses for product market control.
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both workable standards for courts to apply and coherent
guidelines for collective bargaining parties to follow.
ADDENDUM
As this issue went to print, the Supreme Court acted on
the labor aspect of the Consolidated Express case. In NLRB v.
International Longshoremen's Association, 48 U.S.L.W. 4765
(June 20, 1980), the Court affIrmed the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in the latest case concerning the Rules on Containers,
holding that the NLRB had erred as a matter of law in its defi-
nition of the work in controversy. The Court adopted a
"broader" view of the work reacquisition attempt embodied in
the Rules, and remanded the case to the NLRB for further pro-
ceedings. Since the Consolidated Express case hinged on this
erroneous NLRB finding of a labor law violation, the Supreme
Court also vacated the Consolidated Express decision. Consoli-
dated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Association, 602 F.2d
494 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 48 U.S.L.W. 3845 (June 24, 1980).
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